A LETTER TO A Member of Parliament In the COUNTRY,

CONCERNING THE

Preſent Poſture of Affairs in Chriſtendom:

First, *In Defence of the* Treaty of Partition.

Secondly, *Shewing the great Prejudices that* Europe *in General, and* England *in Particular, are like to receive from the Acceptation of the late King of* Spain's *Will, contrary to the Obligations of the ſaid* Treaty.

In Anſwer to

A Letter *from him upon that Subject.*

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THE PREFACE.

THE *Subſtance of this Letter may be reſolv'd, for the Reader's Eaſe, into the following Heads, by way of Abſtract.*

Firſt, *It ſhews the Neceſſity there was for making the* Treaty of Partition, *and the great Advantages which would have enſued the Obſervation of it.*

Secondly, *That the Entring into this* Treaty, *cannot well be charg'd with having given occaſion to the Will in behalf of the Duke of* Anjou.

Thirdly, *That inſtead of creating a Miſunderſtanding between us and the Emperor, 'tis rather what ought to have United us cloſer together, by the Conſiderable Advantages obtain'd in that* Treaty, *for the Houſe of* Auſtria.

Fourthly, *That a due Execution of it, would have prov'd an infallible Means of insuring the Publick Peace of* Europe; *whereas the acceptation of the Will cannot fail of disturbing it.*

Fifthly, *That the Observation of the Treaty could never have brought any Prejudice upon our Trade, nor that of the* Dutch *in the* Mediterranean; *but on the contrary, that the Acceptation of the Will is more likely to Ruine our Trade, both there and elsewhere.*

Sixthly, *That this Acceptation ought to make us apprehensive for the Loss of* Flanders; *and of what Consequence such a Loss would be to* England.

Seventhly, *What Measures we ought to take in so Nice and Important a Juncture.*

A LETTER TO *A Member of Parliament* IN THE COUNTRY, *&c.*

SIR,

I Find by the Honour of your last Letter, that besides the News which I take care to send, you desire farther to have my Thoughts, as, by advance, you have already communicated yours, about the late King of *Spain*'s Will, and the Resolution taken at the

the *French* Court, to accept of it, in Prejudice to the *Treaty of Partition.* I have Examin'd as carefully as I could, the Reaſons whereby you endeavour to prove, it is more for the Advantage of *Europe* in general, and *England* in particular, that *France* ſhould accept of the Will, as it has done, than ſtand to the Engagements of the *Treaty.*

I have generally had a particular Deference for your Judgment, knowing it to be back'd with a thorough Integrity; and it is with a very great Reluctancy and Unwillingneſs, that I muſt now differ from you: Proteſting at the ſame time, that it is both out of Regard to your Perſon, and Concern for the Welfare of the Nation, whoſe Intereſt, as it ought, ſticks very cloſe to my Heart. I am very ſorry to find, that, after having acquir'd ſo much Credit and Reputation as you have in the Houſe of Commons, by your known Zeal, and upright Intentions for the True Intereſt of *England*, with has appear'd in moſt Debates, you ſeem now to be prepar'd, againſt our next Publick Deliberations, which Sentiments that are not, as I conceive, altogether ſo ſuitable to it, as were to be wiſh'd, and you your ſelf would have them. Whether I have any Reaſon or no for my Opinion, is what I refer to your own Judgment in peruſing the following Sheets.

The Character you bear of an Excellent Patriot, which makes you hear reaſon without running into Heats and Parties; and knowing, that you believe me to be thoroughly affected for the Publick Good, and conſequently to aim at the ſame Ends with your ſelf, how much ſoever we differ at preſent in our Thoughts concerning the Means; has encourag'd me to return, with ſo much

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the more freedom, this Anſwer to what you deſire; being very confident, that it will be well taken, as it is well mean't.

1. The Neceſſity there was for making the Treaty of Partition, and the great Advantages which would have enſued the Obſervation of it.

Firſt, *You endeavour to make out in your Letter, That inſtead of entring into a* Treaty, *which would have redounded ſo much to the Advantage of* France, *'twas rather our Buſineſs to keep in with the Emperor, and take ſuch Meaſures jointly with him, as might tend to the procuring the Arch-duke the Succeſſion of* Spain.

Thus far I muſt agree with you in this Point, That it would be much better for us to have that Prince Monarch of *Spain*, than the Duke of *Anjou*; and that he would have kept the Affairs of *Europe* in a better counterpoiſe for the preſerving its publick Peace and Tranquility. But you muſt grant at the ſame time, that this Prince could not be ſeated on that Throne but by one of theſe Two ways; either by engaging into a Confederate War againſt *France*, and aiming at the whole, or entring Into ſuch a *Treaty of Partition* as might peaceably accommodate both Parties.

As for the firſt Caſe the Undertaking would have been too hazardous, and the Event doubtful. Every Body knows very well, that whenever the King of *Spain* ſhould come to dye, ſtill it would be much ſooner than the ſeveral Powers concern'd in the forming a Confederacy for the Arch-duke's Succeſſion, could be in a readineſs to act; and that *France*, having all its Forces at hand, united under one Chief and Intereſt, and without a variety of Dominions to march through, would have been beforehand in a Condition, not only to make very conſider-

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able Progreſſes in *Flanders*, but to march directly to *Madrid* it ſelf, and aſſert there the Pretenſions of its Princes. The *Spaniards* finding themſelves altogether unable to make Head againſt ſuch ſudden Irruptions, would have been forc'd, by a ready Submiſſion, to prevent the utter Ruine and Deſolation of their Country. Their preſent Conduct does but too evidently ſhew what they would have done in that Juncture. Now, Sir, I leave it to your own Judgment, whether in ſuch a Situation of Affairs, we could with any Reaſon have propos'd to our ſelves, after a long and tedious War, at leaſt as general and Expenſive as that terminated by the Treaty of *Ryſwick*, the reducing of a Prince of *France* to quit the Throne of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and reſign it to the Arch-duke, together with the *Low-Countries*; and the *French* King to content himſelf with the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, the Dutchy of *Lorrain* in Exchange for *Milan*, and the other Advantages ſtipulated by the *Treaty*? Would not ſuch a Succeſs be look'd upon as the greateſt Exploit compaſs'd by a Confederacy that has ever been, and as ſomething incredible, and beyond our own Expectation?

One thing is certain, that in order to have ſuch Hopes as theſe grounded upon a Humane Probability, it was abſolutely neceſſary *England* ſhould make as great Efforts, and engage it ſelf in as expenſive a War at leaſt, as that it has lately been freed from. But I dare expect the Concurrence of your Opinion in this, That it was not fit to expoſe the Nation to ſo Burdenſome an inconveniency again, but at the laſt Extremity, and upon the failing of all other Expedients. You know very well, that *England* depending upon a Peace that has coſt it ſo much

much Blood and Treaſure, has turn'd its Thoughts upon making the beſt advantages of it; and for that reaſon has thought it more adviſeable to disband its Forces, than do any thing that look'd like Preparations for a freſh War, however near the occaſion ſeem'd to be to plunge us into it anew, together with the reſt of Chriſtendom. The languiſhing Condition the late King of *Spain* lay in, gave us good Grounds to fear all this might happen in a ſhort time. Tell me then, whether it would have been prudent to tarry for ſuch an Event, to involve us into new Troubles, without any Endeavours beforehand to reconcile if poſſible ſo near and threatning an Emergency with our preſent Tranquility? Could any thing have been thought of more conformable (the caſe being ſo) to the Intereſt both of *England* and *Holland*, to that of the Emperor himſelf, and to the general Good of *Chriſtendom*, than that very *Treaty* you endeavour to condemn?

You inſiſt, *That this* Treaty *would have procured too great Advantages to the* French, *if it had taken effect*. But can you in your conſcience think that they would have been leſs Gainers by a War, than what the *Treaty* allow'd? Or can you believe that *France* would ever have conſented to a *Treaty* for the yealding up of the whole; and the receeding from all thoſe Advantages it had reaſon to expect from the readineſs it is in to act ſo much before-hand with any Confederates, and an almoſt certain Aſſurance of a general Submiſſion among the *Spaniards*, to avoid their being over-run and ruin'd of a ſudden by the quick Torrent of its Arms? Farther, it was no ſmall Point gain'd, to have brought *France* in it to a Renunciation of all its Pretentions

upon the Kingdom of *Navarre*, which ſome time or other might have given occaſion to new Ruptures. And not only ſo; but the main of the Buſineſs was to ſecure *Spain* and the *Indies*, together with the *Low-Countreys*, to the Arch-duke, that is to a Prince whom that piece of Service muſt have ever united to our Intereſt; to ſpare the Nation the Expence of a dangerous and burdenſome War; and to ſecure to it that which at once makes our Proſperity and Glory, the unvaluable Prerogative of holding the Ballance of *Europe* in our hands. Were not then ſuch great Advantages as theſe worthy to be purchaſed at the Price of ſome ſmall Sacrifice?

2. The Entring into the *Treaty* cannot be charg'd with having given occaſion to the making of the Will.

You pretend, as a farther exception, *That the late King of* Spain *would never have been prevail'd with to nominate the Duke of* Anjou *for his univerſal Heir, had it not been for the* Treaty, *thereby to keep the Monarchy entire, contrary to the Deſigns and purpoſes of it; ſo that we muſt look upon the one as having given occaſion to the other.* Think rather, That the Apprehenſions we had of ſuch a Will, in favour of *France*, was a principal Motive for our entring into that *Treaty*; and then I dare ſay your Sentiments will come much nearer to the Truth. Our Court had very good Intelligence, when the *Treaty* was ſet on foot, that the Emperor's Party dwindled, and that the Marquis *de Harcourt* improv'd his Maſter's Intereſt, daily more and more at the Court of *Spain*. We had good Advice, that thoſe perſons who had the greateſt Aſcendent over the King, and who were likely to have the greateſt Influence in the Management of his laſt

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Diſpoſition, were altogether inclin'd for one of the Dauphin's Sons. The Miniſters of *France*, both at home and abroad, made no Secret of the matter, but rather affected to publiſh it; and what they ſaid about it, we had confirmed from leſs ſuſpected hands. So that the Deſign of *England* and *Holland* was in truth to prevent the Effects of ſuch a Will, by mediating a *Treaty of Partition*, in which there was conſequently an apparent neceſſity of giving up ſome parts to ſave the loſs of the whole: 'Twas to provide againſt all Pretences from ſuch a Will, that *France* has been induced to thoſe poſitive and expreſs Renunciations which are to be ſeen in it; and unleſs they would make but a meer Sham of it there, or at moſt that it binds *England* and *Holland* only, without inferring any Obligation upon *France*, it muſt be own'd that the Will, as it now ſtands, is the very Caſe in which that Crown has directly obliged it ſelf to a punctual Obſervation of the *Treaty*, if it had been in a humour of keeping to the Terms and Purpoſes of it.

Well, but ſuppoſe that the *Treaty of Partition* had never had a being, do you think that the King and Grandees of *Spain* could ever have had Faith enough to believe the Arch-duke might have been inſtituted Heir to, and put in Poſſeſſion of the whole Monarchy, without diſmembring any part of it? They could not but be very ſenſible beforehand that *France* would certainly uſe its utmoſt Efforts to obſtruct that Prince's coming to the Throne; and that after a long and cruel War, carried on in their own Countreys, it would have been impoſſible even at beſt to have hinder'd that Crown from keeping ſome parts in its Poſſeſſion. Beſides, in order to

the carrying on ſo vaſt a Deſign they muſt have been fully aſſured of *England:* But did they ſee the Nation in a Temper of engaging vigorouſly into a new War, upon this ſingle Motive of the Arch-duke's having two or three Provinces more or leſs? Or could they imagine that the Arch-duke ſhould ever be able to force *France* to an entire Reſignation, without the greateſt Efforts from *England* that ever have been made in it? They could not but foreſee that the Nomination of the Arch-duke muſt of neceſſity kindle an univerſal War, and a War in which *Spain* muſt have been expos'd as a Prey to the French, whil'ſt at the ſame time it would have been out of the Power of any of their Allies to afford them timely Succours. Such apparent and inevitable Dangers as theſe, muſt of themſelves have determined the King and Grandees of *Spain* in the Duke of *Anjou*'s Favour, though the *Treaty of Partition* had never had a being. His late Majeſty and his Miniſters, as it has evidently appeared, were reſolved to inſtitute ſuch a Succeſſor as might peaceably be ſeated on the Throne: And, could it have been upon a leſs powerful Motive than this, that a King, who all his life time has entertained ſo ſtrict a Correſpondence with the Emperor, that has ſo often been engaged in Confederacies with him for the carrying on War againſt *France*; that has all along appear'd ſo zealous for the Houſe of *Auſtria*, of which he was the elder Branch; would have been prevail'd upon to cut it off from his Succeſſion, and transfer all his vaſt Dominions over to a ſtrange, not to ſay an hoſtile Family? Perhaps you will anſwer, That the *Treaty of Partition* had ſo exaſperated his Catholick Majeſty, as to put him upon the Courſe

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he has taken. But on the contrary, was it not rather a freſh and very engaging Motive to favour the Archduke in the point of his Succeſſion, ſince the Emperor has ſtuck out of the *Treaty* for no other Reaſon but that it was highly diſpleaſing to the King of *Spain*? Did it not rather afford a new Reaſon to exclude *France*, that had been the great Promoter of ſo diſagreeable a piece of work? Let us conclude then, That the late King of *Spain*'s Will muſt be look'd upon as the Production of a fearful Prudence, that has not given him leave to follow the Motions and Dictates of his own Heart.

3. Inſtead of creating a miſunderſtanding between us and the Emperor, the *Treaty of Partition*, ought rather to have united us cloſer together.

You urge, *That the* Treaty of Partition *tended to the creating a Miſunderſtanding between us and the Emperor*. But I think, for my part, we had reaſon to expect the clear contrary Effect from it: If the Emperor's Court would have known, or had been willing to follow its true Intereſt, nothing could have provided more effectually than the *Treaty*, for the eſtabliſhing a moſt ſtrict and inviolable Union between us. Nothing has been tranſacted, during the whole Negotiation, but what has been communicated to that Court; and all poſſible means have been uſed to obtain its approbation before the Concluſion of it: Finding all theſe ſteps to fail of Succeſs, the Emperor has had three Months time given him by the *Treaty*, to conſider deliberately of it; and moreover, to provide againſt his peremptory Refuſal to come in after the expiration of the ſaid Term, and his receiving any Prejudices by it, *France* has been perſwaded to enter into a ſecret

a ſecret Article (which every one knows at preſent) whereby it was ſtipulated, That the Emperor's Acceptation might ſtill be receiv'd to the term of two Months after his Catholick Majeſty's Deceaſe.

The Emperor ought undoubtedly to have declared himſelf within the firſt term, upon many weighty Conſiderations; and not tarry'd for the King of *Spain*'s Death, to ſignifie his Conſent. He was often forewarn'd to take care, leſt a Will in behalf of the Duke of *Anjou* (which was but too probable) ſhould one day foreclose the Arch-duke from the whole Succeſſion, if the Imperial Court did not betimes take proper Meaſures with *England* and *Holland* to oblige *France* in ſuch a Caſe to a punctual Execution of the *Treaty*: We often repreſented, That what was allow'd to the Arch-duke in it was too conſiderable, to neglect the fair Opportunity that offer'd it ſelf to enſure it, without running the Risk of a doubtful War: That his Acceptation of the *Treaty* would bring in all the Princes of the Empire, the *Swiſſe Cantons*, and both the Northern Crowns, to be *Gnarantees* of it: Which Security, being at once required by the Emperor, *England*, *Holland*, and *France* it ſelf, could not have been denied. He had it ſuggeſted to him, That the unanimous Conſent of all *Europe* was the only Expedient that could preſerve Peace at ſuch a time, ſince it would have made ſo ſtrong a *Guaranty* for the Execution of the *Treaty*, that *France* durſt not have ventur'd to break through it. If the Imperial Court would hearken to none of theſe important Suggeſtions; if, by perſiſting in a ſtiff Refuſal, it has encourag'd *France*, and even furniſhed it with a Pretence to recede from thoſe Engage-

Engagements it had enter'd into with us, and confer upon the Duke of *Anjou*'s Head a Crown it had ſo lately renounc'd to in ſo ſolemn and expreſs a manner; This is ſo far from giving a juſt occaſion to blame the *Treaty*, that nothing can better prove how advantageous it would have been to all *Europe*, than the readineſs of the *French* to violate it.

4. The Obſervation of the *Treaty* would have prov'd an effectual Means of preſerving the Publick Peace of *Europe*, but the Acceptation of the Will cannot fail of diſturbing it.

You poceed, and ſay, *That* France *will not fail to alledge in its Defence, that as Affairs are at preſent, and conſidering the Emperor's having perſiſted in his refuſal ſo long, it tends more to the Preſervation of the Publick Peace of* Chriſtendom, *for* France *to accept of the Will, than ſtand to the* Treaty of Partion, *becauſe if the Will were refuſed, and the Dukes of* Anjou *and* Berry *denied the Benefit of it, the* Spaniards *would certainly call in the Arch Duke to take upon him the whole Succeſſion, and ſo keep up to the Purpoſes of the Will, which gives him the next Subſtitution to thoſe Two Princes; And that the Emperor being bound in ſuch a Caſe to ſtand by the Will, and endeavour to keep the Monarchy entire, there would be an evident neceſſity of entring into a War with him and his Allies and the whole Monarchy of* Spain *ſubmitting unanimouſly to the Arch-duke, in which we muſt have ſeveral entire Kingdoms to Conquer, in order to bring matters within the Terms of the* Treaty.

Sir, Give me leave to tell you, that you have but a very indifferent Opinion of the Capacities of the *French* Court, to think its Miniſters can pay the World with ſuch poor Reaſons: When they want good Reaſons for what they do, they at leaſt know better

better how to carry it off with plauſible Colours. What you make them ſay for themſelves runs upon a Principle abſolutely falſe, which conſiſts in ſuppoſing that, even in the preſent Situation of Affairs, the Emperor would ſtill perſiſt in his Refuſal, were the Matter left to his Choice: But ſuch an Abſurdity as this cannot well be thought of. 'Tis true, that the Imperial Court, feeding it ſelf with vain Hopes, that the King of *Spain*'s Will would run altogether on the Arch-duke's ſide, or, at the worſt, imagining that it would ſtill have time to accept of the *Treaty*, in purſuance of the ſecret Article, Two Months after the King of *Spain*'s Death ſhould happen, has upon this double View neglected to conſent to what we demanded. But muſt we from thence conclude, that they would have ſtill perſiſted in the ſame Diſpoſition at *Vienna*, when, undeceived by the Event, they find a Will, wherein not the Arch-duke, but the Duke of *Anjou*, is nominated to the whole Succeſſion, and that the *Spaniards* have received the Will with ſo general an Applauſe and Satisfaction? Is it not certain, that if in this Caſe *France* would ſtill agree to the Execution of the *Treaty*, the Emperor would think himſelf very happy in having his Son Peaceable Sovereign of *Spain*, the *Indies*, and *Flanders*? And if ſo, then this grand Affair, contrary to your Argument, would certainly be made up without the leaſt drop of Blood ſpilt about it.

France at leaſt, to cover its falling off from the *Treaty* with a plauſible Pretence, and to ground this Argument upon Matter of Fact, ought, according to the Engagements of the Secret Article, to have ſtill left

left the Emperor his Choice, either of accepting or refuſing the Conditions of the *Treaty*; and the Emperor ſtill reſolving to ſtick out, then *France* would have had Reaſon indeed, to object the Wars which muſt enſue, if it had ſtood to the *Treaty of Partition* in prejudice of the Will; in order to force the Emperor to content himſelf with the Conditions of it. But this is a Risk that *France* has not thought fit to run, knowing very well, that, as Affairs are at preſent, there was no Reaſon at all to Queſtion the Emperor's Approbation. If the *French* Court could with any Reaſon have reckon'd upon a peremptory Refuſal at *Vienna*, would it not have been a very proper Courſe to have offer'd the Emperor his Choice, thus to have laid the whole Fault at his Door, and remain blameleſs? But if it has not done this upon very good Preſumptions that the Imperial Court would certainly come in, how then can the Miniſters of *France* alledge with any pretence, to juſtifie their Acceptation of the Will, that their ſtanding to the *Treaty* would but occaſion a War to force the Houſe of *Auſtria* and its Allies, to acquieſce in the Conditions of it? To ſay, That although the Emperor had accepted of it, yet ſtill we muſt have had the *Spaniſh* Nation to ſubdue, who in ſuch a Caſe would have uſed their utmoſt Efforts to prevent the Diſmembring of their Monarchy; and conſequently, that notwithſtanding the Emperor's Acceptation, yet ſtill a War could not be avoided, is altogether inconſiſtent even with Common Sence, which without the leaſt improvement in Politicks, muſt of it ſelf convince us, that the *Spaniſh* Nation could never have been able to bring the leaſt Obſtacle, or, even the

leaſt Delay, to the Execution of a *Treaty* which the Emperor and the Empire, *England* and *Holland*, and *France* it ſelf, would then have unanimouſly agreed to.

This Reaſoning, which you impute to the *French* Court, does farther include another very abſurd Contradiction. For, to make it hold Water, they muſt ſuppoſe in *France*, that were they to allow the *Treaty* ſtill to ſubſiſt, the Emperor, not ſatisfied with the great number of Kingdoms and Provinces which would come to the Arch-duke's Share by it, would farther aim by force of Arms at the whole Monarchy, and in order thereto, would boldly ingage into a War againſt *England*, *France*, and *Holland*, united: And at the ſame time to make their Pretence good for Preferring the Will to the *Treaty*, that it tends more to the Preſervation of the Publick Peace; they muſt ſuppoſe, that the Emperor, who now ſees his Son deprived of the whole Succeſſion, will nevertheleſs bear it patiently; notwithſtanding the Hopes he may pretend to of having *England* and *Holland*, together with *Portugal*, of his ſide, by the great Intereſt they have in the Preſervation of the *Treaty* which is now violated; whereas in the other Caſe they would have been againſt him.

5. The Execution of the *Treaty*, could have brought no Prejudice to our Trade, nor that of the *Dutch* in the *Mediterranean*, but on the contrary, the Acceptation of the Will may ruin our Trade both there and elſewhere.

I come now to Conſider your main Argument againſt the *Treaty of Partition*, which you ſet forth *in exagerating the Condition that* France *would have been in, by it, to Command abſolutly the Commerce of the* Mediterranean; *which muſt have brought inevitable ruine upon the Trade*

of

of England *and* Holland: *from whence you infer, that the late King of* Spain's *Will is more for our Advantage than the* Treaty. I cannot forbear telling of you, that I find a Partiality in your Argument, I could not think you capable of: For, if you are really perſuaded, that *France* having once poſſeſſion of the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, would be in a Condition to ruine our Trade in the *Mediterranean*, without being obliged to have any regard to the Alliance grounded upon that very *Treaty*, which then would have had its due Effect; can you imagine it will be more complaiſant to us now, that it has broke through all the Obligations of it; without making the leaſt uſe of thoſe Advantages which the Duke of *Anjou*'s Acceſſion to the Throne of *Spain* ſeems to offer? Why muſt you fancy, that *France* would have gone back from its Ingagements in the firſt Caſe, when it could have only pretended to interrupt our *Levant* Trade; and in the ſecond, that it will be more exact and ſcrupulous, notwithſtanding the Condition it is in of aſpiring at the Command not only of the *Levant* Trade, but likewiſe of the *Indies*; when it has ſo fair an Opportunity of attempting at a Monopoly of the *Spaniſh* Wooll, to the perfecting of its Manufactures, and the ruine of our own; when it has both Power and Pretence for making ſuch Enterprizes upon the *Spaniſh-Netherlands*, as muſt draw the ruine of *Holland* after them, which then muſt be ſoon follow'd by that of *England* too? You will own, I dare ſay, That if *England* and *Holland* appear altogether inſenſible in ſo nice a Juncture, without ſhewing the leaſt inclination to beſtir themſelves, it will be much more eaſie for the *French* to compaſs all theſe

great Deſigns, than to have ruin'd our Trade in the *Mediterranean*, if the *Treaty of Partition* had been fulfill'd: Becauſe, there would ſtill have remain'd ſuch a Counterpoiſe and Ballance of Affairs in *Europe*, in this laſt Caſe, as ſhould have bound *France* to a Peaceable Behaviour, and kept it from any Infractions or Innovations: The Pope, and all the Princes of *Italy*, who muſt have been very Jealous of ſo Powerful Neighbours, would have been ready to take hold of the firſt favourable Opportunity of making a League againſt them, in which the Emperor would have been very willing to come in, both for his Intereſt and that of the Duke of *Lorrain*, his Nephew, who then would have been Duke of *Milan*: The Arch-duke, then King of *Spain*, would have ſtuck cloſe to us, and concurr'd in all thoſe Meaſures which we our ſelves ſhould have thought neceſſary for the ſafety of *Flanders*, the common Barriere both to *England* and *Holland* againſt *France*.

And now, *Sir*, I leave you to Judge, whether *France* durſt have ventur'd upon the interrupting of the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* Trade in the *Mediterranean*; when in the very Attempt, the *French* muſt have brought thoſe Two Powerful Nations, the Emperor and Empire, the King of *Spain*, and all the Princes of *Italy*, upon their back? You would fain remove our Fears and Jealouſies *by the preſent Diſpoſition they have in* France *of living peaceably with their Neighbours.* But who can ſecure you, that this Crown does not feed its Ambition with Hopes of ſucceeding in all thoſe Projects which the favourable Juncture of the Duke of *Anjou*'s Elevation to the Throne of *Spain* may put it upon? This one thing, at leaſt, ſeems to me very expe-

expedient, that we muſt not in common Prudence give the *French* any encouragement to enter into Temptation; by making them ſenſible before-hand of meeting with Difficulties enow to make them miſcarry in the Execution. Should we not render our ſelves altogether inexcuſable, if our preſent Indolence ſhould become their principal Motive for venturing upon any, though never ſo bold and prejudicial Undertakings? that being to be depended upon, they can have no Reaſon at all to apprehend the Event. No ſooner has *France* found, that it could place the Duke of *Anjou* upon the *Spaniſh* Throne, but all the Engagements it lay under to us by the *Treaty of Partition*, have not had force enough to bind it: And can we think, after ſuch an Example as this, that it will make a Difficulty of attempting any thing for its Advantage, in which there may be a probability of Succeſs?

I fell t'other day in Company with a Gentleman, who I believe had not as charitable Thoughts of the Diſpoſition they are in in *France*, as you. *Do not think*, ſaid he, directing his Diſcourſe to me, *That* France *will ſtop ſhort in ſo fair a way of forming great Deſigns; nor that it has renounc'd to ſo many fine Provinces which by* the Treaty of Partition *would have been ſettled upon it; if it did not expect ſome more conſiderable Advantages in accepting of the Will. That Court is too well known for being acted wholly by its Intereſt, for the reſt of the World to believe it has broke through all the Obligations of a* Treaty, *ſo lately and ſo ſolemnly made, upon the ſingle Motive of aggrandizing the Duke of* Anjou. *Sir, you may aſſure your ſelf it has had advantagious ends of its own in the doing of it.* France *does certainly expect to Govern under the name*

of

of the new King, and the Grandfather to have all the Influence he can desire in his Councils. The Recompence lately bestow'd on the Marquis de Harcourt, *in dignifying him with the Title of a* Duke, *does but too evidently bespeak the nature of the Services he has render'd during his Embassy at* Madrid; *and the Choice that is now made of him, to return thither in the same quality, plainly discovers what Services are expected from him there for the future: It is, no doubt, to continue his Intrigues in a Court he is throughly acquainted with. Those among the Grandees whom he has found ways of bringing over to put the late King upon so favourable a Testament to* France, *and who only are employ'd in the present Ministry, will be very apt to second him in all his Projects. They will make it their business to perswade their new Master, who will be ready enough to receive such Impressions, That by closing in with* France *there will be nothing impossible for him; and that he need not doubt of putting himself one day in a condition of re-uniting those flourishing States to his Monarchy which have been not long since dismembred from it. In a Word, not only* England *and* Holland *ought to apprehend the loss of their Trade, but all* Europe *ought to dread the loss of its Liberty.*

This Gentleman was very far from looking upon the Acceptation of the late King of *Spain*'s Will as more for our Advantage than the *Treaty*. Perhaps you will answer, That his Fears and Apprehensions were groundless: But has not the *French* Court it self in effect insinuated the contrary? since in the first Article it declares, as a principal Motive for making the *Treaty of Partition* it has enter'd into joyntly with His Majesty and the States-General, *That it has been with a design to remove all those Umbrages which so many vast Territories, united*

united under one Head, muſt otherwiſe give. They indeed ſpeak at preſent in *France* after another manner; and finding that in ſtead of the Arch-duke, the Duke of *Anjou* himſelf has been nominated, they conceive no more Jealouſies and Fears from the Uniting of all theſe Dominions in one ſingle Power. But I dare ſay, you will find ſuch a Turn as this too partial not to ſuſpect it.

6. The Acceptation of the Will ought to make us fear for the loſs of *Flanders*, and of what conſequence ſuch a loſs would be to *England*.

I may therefore expect your concurrence with me in this point, that in the preſent Poſture of Affairs, *England* and *Holland* cannot ſtand too much upon their Guard. We all know how often *France* has endeavour'd to have the *Spaniſh Netherlands* in its Poſſeſſion, and make a Conqueſt which would have brought ſo conſiderable an addition to its Power. I may farther ſay, That we all ſee theſe Countreys at preſent (unleſs we are reſolved to ſhut our eyes) in greater danger than ever of falling under the Dominion of *France*. They are not like to want there, either Pretences for the ſending Forces upon them, or Means of bringing the *Spaniards* over to conſent to it: And frequent Suggeſtions will be given them of Enemies ready to ſeize upon theſe rich Provinces, and wreſt them at once from their Monarchy and the Catholick Religion. The moſt Chr——n K——'s readineſs to take his Grandſon's Dominions under his Protection, will ſtep in next, and be ſet out in its moſt plauſible Colours and Advantages: And who knows but the old Project may again be ſet on foot of having theſe Countreys yealded up to *France* for an Equivalent?

I do not doubt but you comprehend very well how fatal the Conſequences of ſuch an Event muſt be to us. Not only the adjoyning Countreys of *Liege*, *Juliers*, *Treves* and *Cologne*, could not then avoid coming under the Yoke of *France*; but what deſerves our Care and Attention moſt, *Holland* it ſelf, whoſe Fleets and Armies have had ſo conſiderable a ſhare among the Allies for the common Safety, being expos'd on all ſides to the formidable Power of *France*, would run an evident Risk either of being downright ſubdued by, or at leaſt brought in a ſtate of Vaſſalage to, it.

The *French* being once Maſters of *Flanders*, have no more to do for the giving a deadly Blow to this Republick, but bring back Trade to *Antwerp* by forcing a free Navigation on the *Scheld*; which would leave the *Dutch* no other way of fending off ſuch a Stroke, but by putting themſelves ſo under the Protection of *France*, as to be barr'd from entring into any Leagues without having firſt the Approbation of that Court; and from the enjoyment of their flouriſhing Trade, but upon condition that *France* ſhould ſhare in the Profits of it, and that they in Conjunction with that Crown ſhould endeavour to deſtroy ours. If *France*, having no other Sea-port beſides *Dunkirk* in the *Low Countreys*, has found out the way of drawing ſo conſiderable Advantages from, and making it turn ſo much to the Prejudice of our Navigation? what muſt we expect, when being poſſeſs'd of the remaining Sea-ports of *Flanders*, it will have thoſe of *Zealand* and *Holland* ſo at command, as to diſpoſe of them with the ſame Authority as if they actually belonged to that Crown? Do you in your Conſcience believe we ſhould then be able to make had

head againſt it? and that its Riches being ſo vaſtly encreas'd with the number of its Subjects, and its Union with *Spain* putting it in a fair way of having the main Aſcendent over, or rather Command of Trade, from the *Baltick* to the *Levant* and the *Indies*, we could find a competent Rampart in our Fleet, which then would be our only remaining one, to withſtand a Power ſo formidable both by Land and Sea?

We have ſome People in *England* extravagant enough to fanſie, That with a good Fleet we need not fear tho' all the World were againſt us; which Opinion of theirs runs 'em into this moſt dangerous Maxim, *That we need not concern our ſelves at all with the ſtate of things abroad, even among our neareſt Neighbours.* But after the Experience of the late War, one would think it were needleſs to confute ſo groundleſs an Errour: We do not meet with it now, but in the Mouths of ſome falſe-hearted Proteſtants for ſome by Ends which are known to every Body; or of open and profeſs'd Papiſts, who would gladly ſee the Proteſtant Religion and Intereſt quite oppreſs'd among our Neighbours, as well as their Laws and Liberties; in hopes thereby of ſeeing the ſame thing effected in *England* ſoon after; the one being an apparent Conſequence of the other. 'Tis what the Repreſentatives of the Nation were very ſenſible of in the late War, and therefore what put them upon making thoſe Efforts, as ſhew'd they had no leſs Penetration in Judging of our Danger, than Zeal and Readineſs to prevent it. They were fully convinc'd, that the Intereſt as well as Glory of *England* conſiſts in keeping the Ballance of *Europe* in our Hands, which infers an indiſpenſable neceſſity of con-

cerning our ſelves with what happens in it. They were ſenſible the Nation could not carry its Trade in too many Places, and that in order thereunto we muſt make a great many Alliances, which conſequently it muſt be our true Intereſt vigorouſly to maintain, and faithfully to obſerve. If they thought it their Duty on the one Hand to help and aſſiſt their Allies, on the other they were far from deſpiſing thoſe Succours which might be had from them. They readily admitted the Junction of the *Dutch* Fleet to ours, being well ſatisfied it added very much to our Strength and Power. In a Word, their whole Conduct made it plainly appear, they were throughly perſuaded, *That, as* Europe *could not then be reſcued from Slavery, but by the effectual Succours of* England, *ſo neither can* England *eſcape if the reſt of* Europe *be inſlav'd.*

And yet this is an Extremity we ſhould ſoon find our ſelves reduc'd to, if *France* being poſſeſs'd of *Flanders*, ſhould once diſable the *Dutch* from being in a Condition to aſſiſt us, or which is yet worſe, force them to a neceſſity of joining againſt us in their own Defence, to bring that preſent Ruine upon others, which otherwiſe would fall upon them. All manner of Communication being then cut off between us and *Germany*, they finding in the Empire no poſſibility of receiving any help from *England*, would neither have the Will nor the Power of making the leaſt Diverſion in our favour. And to compleat our Diſaſters, What Condition ſhould we be in, if our Fleet, which then would be our only, though weak Refuge, were either ſhatter'd in a Storm, or defeated in Battle? *Sir*, I appeal to your own Judgment, if after the ruine of our Trade,

Trade, we could be able to ſuſtain a War with an already formidable Crown, after ſuch vaſt acceſſions to its Strength both by Sea and Land? Let our Merchants judge, whether we could carry on our Trade, if the Seaports of *Holland*, and thoſe of *Spain* both in the Old and New World, were ſhut againſt us? When *France* commanding the Treaſures both of *Peru* and *Mexico*, would make quite another uſe of them, than what *Spain* has done? In ſhort, when our Merchant Ships, Iſlands and Plantations, would lie at the diſcretion of thoſe vaſt Fleets, both of Men of War and Privateers, which this Power would then cover the Seas with?

Were it neceſſary to enter farther into Particulars, for the making out this too palpable Truth, I could eaſily demonſtrate, that as Affairs would then ſtand, we might be denied the Liberty of the *Baltick* as well as *Mediterranean* Seas; and of Trading our ſelves into *Spain*, *Italy*, the *Levant*, and the *Indies*; that *Portugal* would not dare receive our Ships into its Harbours, or, which is yet more to be feared, would be in danger of being re-united, as it has lately been, to the Crown of *Spain*; That the ruine of our Manufactures would quickly follow that of our Navigation; But this appears too plain for me to inſiſt upon it.

May be you are ready to anſwer, *That theſe things cannot come to paſs without ſuppoſing an Union of* Spain *to* France, *which is not likely to happen; and that it is to be hop'd the new King will ſoon become a very good* Spaniard. But is it not rather more likely, that this Prince will in the main follow the Humour and Directions of *France* in the Management of his Affairs; and that the Duke of *Harcourt* will be in the Secret,

and at the bottom of all his Counſels? I may add, That a falſe Zeal for Religion, whoſe Maxims *France* does blindly follow, and which prevails no leſs in *Spain*, will be a very Powerful Motive to unite theſe Two Crowns together in the ſame Meaſures and Intereſts, and ſet them upon the ruine of thoſe that paſs among them for Hereticks; eſpecially when that puts them upon a proſpect of carrying on the whole Trade of *Europe* between them. Farther, it is more than probable, that the Grandees of *Spain*, having ſo openly declared themſelves againſt the Emperor's Pretentions, and who for that Reaſon cannot be well look'd upon at the Court of *Vienna*, will throw themſelves altogether into the *French* Intereſt. I ask then, if while we are threaten'd with ſo great and apparent Dangers, we muſt quietly expect our Deſtiny, without making uſe of thoſe Remedies we have ſtill in reſerve to provide againſt them?

7. What Meaſures we ought to take in ſo nice and important a Juncture.

There is no other way for us to avert theſe Miſchiefs, but by putting our ſelves (together with *Holland*) in a good Poſture of Defence: That of it ſelf will ſtill have ſome Awe upon *France*, and oblige it to keep Meaſures with us; otherwiſe we may expect ſuch Infractions and Innovations as muſt involve us at laſt into an unhappy War; and the beſt way to avoid it, is to ſhew we are diſpos'd upon Occaſion to carry it on with the utmoſt vigour. If any thing is capable of opening the *Spaniards* Eyes, and making them liſten to their true Intereſt, which is to keep in the ſame Terms with *England* and *Holland* as in the late Reigns, it muſt be by making them ſenſible

ſenſible we have ſtill both the Will and the Power to Look to our Selves, and Stand effectually by our Allies: Without this, they muſt cloſe in with *France*, and leave us the diſpleaſure of having oblig'd them to it. If our Preparations prevent a War, can we deſire a happier Effect from them? But if they cannot prevent our being Attack'd, do they not then become abſolutely neceſſary for our Defence?

As Circumſtances are at preſent, that our Trade runs no ſmall Risk, I hope you will allow that we are under an indiſpenſable Obligation of having a good Fleet at Sea; and that it is no leſs neceſſary to keep up the publick Credit of the Nation, in making good all deficient Funds: But, that which ought chiefly to be the Care of the Nation; we muſt give all poſſible Demonſtrations of an entire Confidence in the KING, and let the World know, in as publick and authentick a manner as we can, That we ſhall always be ready to concur with and ſecond His Majeſty to the utmoſt of our Power in ſuch Engagements as He ſhall think neceſſary to enter into abroad, for the Safety and Welfare of his People.

How great ſoever our Dangers may ſeem, yet we have this for our preſent Comfort, That we ſhall not want Power to help our ſelves, whil'ſt we have that RENOWN'D PRINCE, who ſo Glorioufly fills the Throne, at the Helm of Affairs. It is impoſſible even to think upon thoſe Misfortunes in which the preſent Juncture of Affairs would inevitably involve *Europe* in general, and *England* in particular, without trembling, were we now wanting the unvaluable Benefit of His Prudent Adminiſtration! Nothing leſs than

a Prince

a Prince who has ſo much Credit and Intereſt in all the Courts of *Germany*, who bears ſo great a Sway in *Holland*, and upon that account is ſo fit to Cement that Union between us and this Commonwealth, which is now more than ever neceſſary, can effectually provide for the common Safety: And ſince the paſt Experience of his Reign tells us, That God has granted and preſerv'd this Prince to us for our Deliverance in many preſſing Dangers and Difficulties, let us make the beſt Advantage we can of that Time which God has ſtill in ſtore for him! Let us ſhew to all *Chriſtendom*, by our Zeal and Cheerfulneſs in ſtanding by ſo worthy a CHIEF, That we are not a Nation whoſe Alliance is to be neglected, and Enmity deſpis'd. I am,

Sir, *&c.*

London, *Dec.* 1. 1700.

FINIS.